Forrest is the devil, and I think he has got some of our troops under cower. . . . I will order them to make up a force and go out to follow Forrest to the death, if it costs ten thousand lives and breaks the Treasury. There will never be peace in Tennessee until Forrest is dead! – Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman
[Publisher’s Note, by Gene Kizer, Jr. – Nathan Bedford Forrest is one of the greatest military leaders of all time. His tactics on the battlefield have been studied around the world since the end of the war. He has been a powerful inspiration to generations of American warriors especially from the South, where patriotism and military service are sacred traditions. Until Biden and Harris came along and devastated military recruiting with racist DEI and weak, uninspiring leadership, 44% of our military was recruited in the South.
This account of the June 10, 1864 Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads in Lee County, Mississippi comes verbatim from John Allan Wyeth’s famous book, Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest.i No words were changed but a handful of spelling/grammar improvements were made. The endnotes are exactly as Wyeth wrote them.]
By ten o’clock, when Lyon had thrown out his skirmishers, Forrest in person had come up with his escort, took command of Lyon’s troops, which numbered eight hundred riflemen, and opened the famous battle of Brice’s Cross-Roads, which took place in Lee County, Mississippi, on the 10th of June, 1864. It has passed into history as one of the most signal victories of the Civil War, considering the forces engaged. On this field General Forrest displayed not only that bull-dog tenacity of purpose which characterized his aggressive method of warfare, but his remarkable ability as a strategist and those original methods of fighting which then won success and have since attracted the closest attention of students of military science.
The contending forces were: On the Union side, 3,200 cavalry and 4,500 infantry, with 22 pieces of artillery, commanded by General Samuel D. Sturgis; on the Confederate side, 4,713 mounted troops, with 12 pieces of artillery, under General N. B. Forrest [Note in book: “The artillery companies are not included in this enumeration. These would bring the Union strength to about 8,000, and the Confederate to about 4,875.”]
At Brice’s the main highway, leading from Memphis to Ripley, and on in a direction slightly east of south to Fulton in Mississippi, intersects almost at a right angle another important road leading from Corinth through Rienzi, Booneville, Baldwyn, and in a southwesterly direction to Pontotoc.
With the exception of two or three cleared patches of land, not exceeding six acres in extent, immediately around Brice’s house, the country, which is only slightly undulating, for a mile in every direction was at the time of the battle not only heavily timbered, but there was an undergrowth of black-jack and scrub-oak so dense that in places the troops could with difficulty force their way through, and, being then in full leaf, it was possible to approach within a few yards without being seen.
About one mile northeast of Brice’s, the Corinth road, with a worm-fence on either hand for about a quarter of a mile, passed through a field, to the outskirts of which on all sides the dense undergrowth extended. This field was enclosed by a heavy rain-fence reinforced on top with poles and brushwood.
About the same distance on the highway leading from Brice’s towards Ripley and Memphis the road-bed descended some twenty feet into the Tishomingo Creek bottom, along which stream there was a large cornfield, at that time in cultivation, and here this sluggish stream was spanned by a small wooden bridge.
Grierson, satisfied that the Confederates were in considerable strength, dismounted Waring’s brigade (1,450 strong), which he posted behind the fence in the edge of the dense timber, about equally divided on the north and south side of the road along which Forrest was advancing. Two rifle guns and two howitzers were thrown into position on a slight elevation just behind his line, and 100 picked men armed with revolving rifles were sent forward and concealed in the fence corners of the lane about a hundred yards in advance of his main line.
To the right of Waring was dismounted Grierson’s other brigade under Winslow (numbering 1,750), and the extreme right of this portion of the Union line was slightly “refused,” or drawn back, in the direction of Brice’s house.
It will be seen that at this critical moment (for General Forrest) General Grierson had on the field 3,200 cavalry with four pieces of artillery in position and six others in reserve, confronted four hundred yards away by 800 mounted troops of Lyon’s brigade, with the escort company of 85 men, and Gartrell’s company, 50 strong, and with no Confederate artillery within eight miles.
Forrest was naturally an offensive fighter. He rarely stood to receive an attack. If his troops were mounted and the enemy moved first upon him, he always advanced to meet their charge. In a memorable interview with a Federal officer he said he would “give more for fifteen minutes of bulge on the enemy than for a week of tactics.” He believed that one man in motion was worth two standing to receive an attack.
When he realized how strong the enemy in his immediate front was, his chief anxiety was that they might charge in force and run over this small command. Rucker was still two miles in the rear and Johnson was yet behind him. He immediately had Lyon’s troops dismounted and thrown into line, and their position behind the fence strengthened by brush and logs.
To prevent Grierson from attacking, it was important to make a show of force, and with characteristic effrontery, having alternate panels of the worm-fence thrown down, he ordered Lyon to make a demonstration by advancing from the edge of the woods into the open field. Lyon threw out a double line of skirmishers and marched boldly towards the enemy’s position.
That Forrest’s advance was “pure bluff” should have been clear to Grierson, for Lyon’s right just reached the Baldwyn road, while his left extended only a little beyond the junction of Waring’s and Winslow’s brigades. He was thus widely overlapped on either flank. Major E. Hunn Hanson, of Waring’s brigade, says of this movement: “The Confederate line advancing was shorter than our own, their left ending in front of the left and centre of Winslow’s brigade.”ii
With artillery and small arms the Union line opened upon the Confederates, who kept up their feigned attack for about an hour, then they withdrew without confusion to the edge of the woods from which they had started, and there resumed their position behind the layouts. Major Hanson (above quoted) says: “The Confederates retired with but little disorder to the edge of the woods and kept up a skirmish fire at long range for some time.”
It was at this moment that Colonel E. W. Rucker, with his brigade of 700 mounted men, came on the scene. When within two miles of Lyon’s position, hearing the cannonade, he put spurs to his horse and went rapidly forward with his hardy riders to the relief of his chieftain.
Forrest at once dismounted the Seventh Tennessee regiment and Chalmer’s Eighteenth Mississippi battalion of Rucker’s command, placing them in line to the left of Lyon’s troops, opposing the centre of Winslow’s brigade. The Eighth Mississippi, under Duff, was kept mounted, and thrown well over to the left toward the Guntown road to protect that flank of the Confederates from being turned. All told, the Confederates now had on the field 1,635 men, with Grierson’s division, 3,200 strong, in line of battle opposing them.
Forrest again ordered his lines forward, with the same purpose for which the original attack was made, and after some sharp firing, although not at close range, the Confederates again retired. Chalmer’s battalion, mistaking the object of the movement, had advanced too far to the front and received an enfilading fire from the right of Winslow’s line, which threw them into confusion, but they rallied on the main Confederate lines.
As the troops came back a second time, Colonel W. A. Johnson arrived with 500 Alabamians, being that portion of his brigade whose horses had not given out in the forced march they had just made from northern Alabama. These troops Forrest directed to dismount, take position on Lyon’s right, and move forward to engage the attention of the left of the Union line.
After some desultory fighting, lasting not longer than five minutes, Johnson also retired. Major Hanson says of this incident: “Later, about three hundred Confederates advanced against Waring’s extreme left, but were easily repulsed.”iii
It was now about eleven o’clock, and although Bell’s brigade, which numbered more than the Confederates troops at the front, and the artillery under Morton were not within supporting distance, Forrest determined to close in with Grierson in deadly earnest.
He rode hurriedly along his entire line with words of encouragement to his troops, telling them that he expected every man to move forward when the signal was given. It was not to be a feint, but desperate work, and at close quarters.
At the sound of the bugle the dismounted troopers sprang from the edge of the timber, leaped through the fence, and with a wild yell rushed into the open space towards the Union line. Such was their eagerness that the commands seemed to vie with each other as to which should first reach their antagonists. The men of Waring and Winslow seemed imbued with the same desperate purpose, for they stood their ground right manfully, their repeating-rifles crackling away in deafening roar, first at a distance, and then, as the lines came clashing together, into the very faces of the Confederates.
It fell to Rucker to make the first impression upon the Union position. At the head of the Seventh Tennessee and Chalmer’s battalion, he swept onward with such impetuosity that he carried his part of the line fully one hundred yards in advance of Lyon and Johnson.
Concentrating his fire on this part of the Confederate line, Waring had hoped to check or break it here, and when, under the fearful ordeal, it wavered for a moment, he sprang forward with two of his regiments to drive it from the field. To make assurance doubly sure, this vigilant officer brought up the Second New Jersey and the Seventh Indiana to fill the gap made by his counter-charge and to reinforce his line.
It was a brave and desperate venture, and worthy of the brave Waring. But Rucker’s men were not to be denied. Stubborn of will and apt pupil of his great commander, he had already won the confidence of his faithful soldiers. As the Union troops rushed forward, he shouted to his Southerners to draw their six-shooters and close with them hand to hand, and in one of the most fiercely contested short encounters of the war the Federals were finally forced to retire.
The desperate character of this attack, and the obstinate resistance with which it was met, may be appreciated from an account by a participant, in J. P. Young’s History of the Seventh Tennessee Cavalry:
The Federals occupied a wood on the far side of the field behind a rail-fence, greatly strengthened with logs and brush piled up against it. It was very hot and sultry when the command was given, and as we approached, the fence seemed ablaze with crackling breech-loaders.
The fire was so terrific that the regiment staggered for a moment, and some of the men fell flat upon the earth for protection. They again pushed forward, reached the fence, and began to pull the brush away in order to close with the Federals. So close was this struggle guns once fired were not reloaded, but used as clubs, and pistols were brought into play, while the two lines struggled with the ferocity of wild beasts.
Never did men fight more gallantly for their position than did the determined men of the North for this black-jack thicket on that hot June day. Sergeant John D. Huhn, of Company B, being a few feet in advance, came face to face with a Federal, presented his gun, and ordered the Union soldier to throw his weapon down.
Several Federal soldiers rushed to the rescue of their comrade. With clubbed guns they broke Sergeant Huhn’s arm and struck him over the head until he fell senseless. Privates Lauderdale and Maclin, of the Seventh Tennessee, ran to his aid, shot two of his stout-hearted assailants, and drove the others away with clubbed guns.
Of these attacks Colonel George E. Waring, Jr., says: “They were exceedingly fierce. The first assault was repulsed. The second one, after a hand-to-hand fight, was successful, and forced back my right, although the whole Second New Jersey and the Seventh Indiana were brought into action. After falling back a short distance I succeeded in forming a second line, which was held until the infantry came up to relieve my command, the men being much fatigued and out of ammunition.”iv
Of this incident Major E. Hunn Hanson, of the Fourth Missouri Cavalry (Waring’s regiment), says: “The line of the enemy in view did not exceed twenty-five hundred, and was somewhat shorter than our cavalry in position. They advanced and were repulsed, and with little disorder fell back. Again marching upon the cavalry, when within fifty yards of Waring’s line, the centre of that command slowly gave way.”v
Forrest had only 2,080 men on the field at the moment, and as every regiment but one was fighting dismounted, deducting the troops left with the horses, he had actually engaged in this fierce and successful attack not more than 1,700 troops. He had strengthened his centre, and, while the enemy’s flanks were strongly assailed, he had broken through the Union line at this point. Just as this was accomplished, Johnson and Lyon, with equal courage, had closed in with the left of the Federal forces, while Duff’s Mississippi regiment, mounted, on the extreme Confederate left, was vigorously engaged in holding the attention of the extreme right of Grierson’s line.
As Waring’s centre gave way, the gallant W. A. Johnson and his Alabamians advanced so rapidly and eagerly that he had gained a point fully half-way between his original position and the road leading from Ripley to Brice’s, along which the infantry coming to reinforce Grierson was now advancing.
Still pushing onward, Rucker, leading this brilliant assault mounted, was too fair a target to escape. Several bullets passed through his clothing; his horse, five times wounded, fell at last from a mortal shot. His rider received a bullet in the abdomen, which, though painful, was fortunately not fatal; nor did he yield his position at the head of his troops until the field was won.
The Union cavalry was now beaten at all points of the line, and by 12:30 Forrest had carried out the first part of his program, namely, that he would have their cavalry whipped by the time the infantry could get up.
At ten o’clock in the morning, when Forrest came on the field, he dispatched Major Charles W. Anderson of his staff, towards Booneville with the order, “Tell Bell to move up fast and fetch all he’s got,” and for Morton to bring the artillery on at a gallop.
Nor had he forgotten the famous movement upon the flank and rear of his opponent which he always employed, and which in all probability was one of the chief factors in this wonderful success.
He directed General A. Buford (his division commander) to take Colonel C. R. Barteau’s Second Tennessee regiment of Bell’s brigade, when it should have arrived within five miles of the battlefield, and to proceed across the country through the woods and by-ways until he struck the road over which Sturgis would pass from Stubbs’s to the cross-roads. Barteau says: “My instructions were to take my regiment, numbering then 250 men, across the country by out-of-the-way routes, to slip in upon the Federal flank and rear, and to attack them in co-operation with Forrest’s force in front.”vi
How well Barteau did his work and what commotion he caused in the Union lines will appear in the course of the narrative.
When the Confederates were first encountered, General Grierson had sent a courier to Sturgis, who was then some six miles back, for reinforcements, and this request was repeated with greater urgency when Rucker and Johnson came on the field and joined hands with Lyon in their desperate onslaught. It was, however, not until twelve o’clock that the Union commander in person came upon the scene, and more than an hour later when the head of the infantry column began to appear. These had been urged forward as fast as the condition of the road and the extreme heat would permit.
Colonel Hoge, who led the advance brigade of infantry, says: “It was impossible to keep up the rapid gait. I received a peremptory order to move forward rapidly, as the enemy was gaining ground, and the only thing that would save us was the infantry. Three-quarters of a mile from the field I received an order from Colonel McMillen in person to move forward at double quick, which was done.”vii
Coming upon the scene, Hoge’s brigade, the One Hundred and Thirteenth, One Hundred and Eighth, Ninety-fifth, and Eighty-first Illinois Infantry, with Battery B of the Second Illinois Artillery (four guns), were immediately thrown into line, their battery being placed at Brice’s house.
These reinforcements had not all formed in line before the first brigade, under Colonel A. Wilkin, also arrived. The Ninety-fifth Ohio, One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois, Ninety-third Indiana, and Seventy-second Ohio Infantry were thrown into line at points most needed while Mueller’s section of the Sixth Indiana battery, reinforced by Chapman’s full battery, were posted on an eminence in the rear of Brice’s house. Battery E, of the First Illinois Light Artillery, and the Nineteenth Minnesota Artillery, were held in reserve at the cross-roads.
Thirty-six hundred Union infantry, who as yet had not fired a shot, with three batteries of artillery additional, had come upon the scene reinforcing Grierson’s division, which Forrest had already beaten, and this entire force was confronted by the two thousand Confederates which General Forrest had at hand.
Behind this bulwark of infantry the Federal troopers, exhausted and beaten, mounted their horses and took refuge, some even quitting the field, as the official records show, “without orders.” Still back of these, and then in sight, was another infantry brigade of colored troops, with artillery under Colonel Bouton held in reserve.
In crescentic line, and this in some portion of double formation, the Federal army now extended from well north of the Baldwyn road across to, and some two hundred yards beyond or west of, the road from Ripley to Guntown.
At this propitious moment for the success of Forrest’s battle, just as the Federal infantry were swinging into line, Morton came up with the artillery, and at his heels were Generals Buford and Tyree H. Bell, with the latter’s full brigade of fresh troops, which within the last six months had been recruited within the Union lines in west Tennessee. The artillery consisted of Morton’s and Rice’s battery, which had traveled eighteen miles since daylight over roads so muddy that for much of the distance it was with great difficulty the horses could drag the pieces along. For the last six miles it required the most vigorous urging with whip and spur to push them forward in a trot.
To the right of the road from Baldwyn, as Morton advanced in rear of Lyon’s position, his batteries were brought into action and opened with telling effect. General Sturgis says of this particular period of the engagement: “Finding that our troops were being hard pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy’s reserve. Their artillery soon replied, and with telling accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.”viii
With fatal precision scarcely excelled by the sharp-shooter with his Whitworth globe-sighted rifle, Captain John W. Morton, the famous young artillerist who had celebrated his twenty-first birthday on the bloody field of Chickamauga, with clear eye and steady heart was sending his shells with deadly purpose right to the spot.
Placing Buford in command of the right wing, where Johnson and Lyon were operating, Forrest, with Bell’s troops, moved to the Confederate left and dismounted to the left of Rucker, extending his now strengthened line westward of the road leading from Brice’s to Guntown.
Still farther to the Confederate left, mounted and guarding that wing and ready to swoop around and upon the Union flank and rear, were two companies of Kentuckians, upon which, under their dashing leader Captain H. A. Tyler, Forrest knew he could rely on most desperate work when the occasion offered.
The other mounted companies, his famous escort under Captain Jackson, and Gartrell’s Georgians on headquarters duty with Forrest, were kept immediately with the general.
The two opposing armies now faced each other for the supreme effort.
About eight thousand Federal soldiers, with twenty-two pieces of artillery, confronted Forrest, who, with an audacity born of supreme confidence in this men as well as in himself, moved forward to attack them. As most of the Confederates fought dismounted, deducting those left with the horses in the rear, the Confederate commander could not have carried into action in this desperate encounter over thirty-three hundred troops with twelve pieces of artillery
For some thirty minutes the sounds of war had ceased. A rifle here and there from some sharp-shooter or venturesome skirmisher spoke out in vicious challenge, but the wild fusillade and the crackle and roar of hundreds and thousands of guns no longer swept to and fro along the double rainbow of men in deadly earnest for the undoing of each other. It was the calm before the storm
Forrest, in apt phraseology, more forcible than elegant, had measured the heat when he said to Rucker that morning, in his forecast of the fight and of the day, “It is going to be hot as hell.” The troops, and animals as well, in both contending armies had suffered extremely, and a goodly number had fallen from exhaustion and sunstroke.
On the Union side, Grierson’s cavalry had been fighting steadily from ten until two, and fighting is terribly exhausting work. They had been roughly handled to boot, and had a right to be wearied and worried.
On the Confederate side, Johnson’s, Rucker’s, and Lyon’s men, who had “knocked out” Waring’s and Winslow’s brigades, were equally fatigued. Bell’s famous brigade, which had just arrived, had traveled twenty-five miles to reach the battlefield, and for the last fourth of the journey their horses had been urged to the full limit of their endurance and speed.
The Union infantry had also suffered much,
Forrest was fully alive to the conditions which, in spite of his numerical weakness, favored him. He had no thought of giving his enemy an opportunity to “catch their wind.”
He had informed Buford that everything was ready on the left and that he must push his end of the line (the right) and engage as much as possible the attention of the enemy in that direction. He added that they were massing in front of him, and that their left would not offer as much resistance as he and Bell would encounter. Johnson, on the extreme right of the Confederate line, was urged to crowd in as closely as possible on the road leading from Ripley to Brice’s.
The two Federal brigades of infantry under Hoge and Wilkins had scarcely effected their alignment when over to their left the rifles of Johnson and Rucker told them the fight had reopened, and at this moment everything in the Confederate line of battle moved to the front.
There was now no open country except a few acres immediately about Brice’s house. Through the thick and almost impenetrable undergrowth, just where Hoge had formed his sturdy Westerners in double array, both ranks lying prone upon the ground for concealment as well as protection, there came with guns trailing and bodies bent as close to the earth as possible the rustling sound of a moving body of men among the foliage as with difficulty they pushed their way forward.
These were the Tennesseeans, as stanch and brave a set of men as every served in war, under Tyree H. Bell, the Blücher of this hard-fought field.
When within only a few paces of the Federal line, which as yet they could not see, the rifles of Hoge’s infantry burst forth, a withering flash and murderous roar into the very faces of the Confederates.
Under this fierce and sudden fire, which inflicted serious loss, a part of Bell’s men gave way. Taking quick advantage of the momentary confusion he had caused, Hoge, with great gallantry, believing that the entire line of the enemy would yield if a general advance was made, ordered his whole force forward, directing his attack principally on the right of Bell and the left of Rucker’s position.
Forrest, knowing the heavy fighting would be just at this point, had remained with the troops, and, seeing the disaster which now threatened him, dismounted from his horse, called to his two escort companies to dismount and hitch their horses to the bushes, and with these daring fighters gathered about him he rushed into the thickest of the fray, pistol in hand, to take his place in the front rank with his men.
With equal dash and courage, Bell did the same; and with such examples and under such leadership the Tennesseeans quickly rallied, and, being reinforced by Lieutenant-Colonel D. M. Wisdom, who with 280 men of Newsom’s regiment had been held in reserve behind this portion of the line, they checked the retreat and advanced again upon the enemy.
Arrested in front of Bell, the Federal infantry pushed on in gallant style against the thinner line of Rucker; but this sturdy fighter had no notion of yielding the position he had won after such a fierce struggle. He knew from the way the rifles were cracking on his left that Forrest was hard at work there and was holding his own.
As the Federal infantry came on with bayonets fixed, Rucker shouted, “Kneel on the ground, men, draw your six-shooters, and don’t run!”
Against this plucky wall the onrushing Federals struck hard, but rebounded. They could not break through it, and in fierce and bloody hand-to-hand combat the bayonet was no match for the repeating-pistol, and the Union troops gave way as the whole Confederate line rushed forward with irresistible force.
As the centre of Hoge’s line crumbled away in this terrific onslaught, Johnson, with Lyon’s prompt aid, had pushed back the extreme left of McMillen’s line until it was now doubled back upon the Ripley road.
At this important juncture Forrest received a message from the ever-watchful Buford, which was invaluable to him. From the open position occupied by this officer on the extreme right, he had observed a sudden movement of the Union cavalry from near Brice’s house to the rear, and could now distinguish musketry off to his right in the direction of Tishomingo Creek. Barteau was there with the Second Tennessee. He had arrived just in the nick of time and had struck the rear and flank of Sturgis’s column.
The brilliant strategy of Forrest was now to prove its value in deciding the fate of the Union army. Of this moment Colonel Barteau says:
I succeeded in reaching the Federal rear just as the fighting seemed heaviest in front. I at once deployed my men in a long line, had my bugler ride up and down sounding the charge at different points, and kept up as big a show as I could and a vigorous fire upon the Federals until their complete route was evident. I was in the flank and rear of their position when Waring’s and Winslow’s brigades came back.ix
This brilliant movement, executed with vigor and precision, had, at this crisis of the battle, not only thrown the reserve brigade of infantry and the train-guard into commotion, but had withdrawn from Forrest’s immediate front practically all of Grierson’s cavalry that could offer him effectual resistance.
Forrest’s perception told him that the crisis of the day had come and that now the battle must be won or lost. It was past four o’clock. How swiftly and unheeded is the flight of time when the storm of battle is raging! For more than two hours these desperate men of either army had been in murderous strife at close range since Bell and Morton had arrived. With savage fierceness, against heavy odds, Forrest’s men had fought, and it seemed that the extreme of human endurance had been reached.
Riding along the rear of the line, encouraging his troops by telling them that the enemy were giving way, that their rear was attacked by Barteau, and that only one supreme effort was necessary to sweep them from the field, he hastened to the position of Morton with the artillery, upon whom at this moment he greatly depended.
As he rode up to Morton, whose guns were then in action, the position being one at close range to the enemy and of great exposure, the artillerist ventured to say to his general that it was too dangerous a place for him, and suggested that he should go to the rear a short distance, where it was safer. He noticed that Forrest was much exhausted and was surprised that he yielded to the advice of his subordinate.
Riding back some thirty or forty yards, he called Morton to him as he laid himself upon the ground at the root of a big tree. Here he said to the artillerist that he believed he had the enemy beaten, and that while they were still holding on with considerable stubbornness near the cross-roads, he felt convinced that one more vigorous charge along the whole line, in which the artillery should take an active part, would be successful.
He said that he would order his charge within ten minutes, and directed him to take four guns, double-shotted with canister, and, as soon as the bugler sounded the charge, to hitch the horses to them, gallop forward as close as possible to the enemy, and open upon them at close range. The signal for Morton was the heavy firing on the right.
Forrest then rode farther over to the right to give Buford his final instructions. General Buford said that Forrest told him what part Morton was to play he suggested that it would be dangerous to send the guns forward without any support; but Forrest replied, “Buford, all the Yankees in front of us cannot get to Morton’s guns.”
After the battle and pursuit were over, and two days later when the artillerist was returning with his pets, Forrest rode up to him, laid his hand on his shoulder, and said, “Well, John, I think your guns won the battle for us.”
Flushing with pride at this great praise from the man he idolized, Morton said, “General, I am glad you think so much of our work, but you scared me pretty badly when you pushed me up so close to their infantry and left me without protection. I was afraid they might take my guns.”
To this Forrest replied as he rode away, “Well, artillery is made to be captured, and I wanted to see them take yours.”
Hurrying back to Bell, he ordered Tyler, with his two companies of Kentuckians, Captain Jackson of the escort, and Captain Johnson, with Gartrell’s Georgians, that when the firing became general along the line they must charge around the Federal right flank and into their rear, rush in and engage at pistol-range any Federal troops between their right and the Tishomingo Creek bridge.
Forrest’s famous tactics were now to be demonstrated,
In the face of a tremendous discharge of small arms and artillery, and amid the wild yells of the successful Confederates, the Federal line gave way stubbornly, for a little space, and then yielded in disorder.
Morton, with his horses hitched to the guns, swept forward along the country road, so narrow that only four pieces could be employed, with such boldness that in all probability the Federal commander at this point felt he was heavily supported, and when within short range of the centre and right of the Union line he made his double-shotted canister tell on their ranks with frightful effect. Rucker’s final charge on the centre and Bell’s quick rush to the left carried away the last vestige of organization on the part of the Federals and their line was at last irreparably broken.
Colonel McMillen, commanding the [Federal] infantry, says:
As the enemy on our right were being driven back by the Ninth Minnesota and Ninety-third Indiana, I directed Captain Fitch to put one section of his artillery into position on the Guntown road and sweep it with grape and canister. Soon after the left and left-centre gave back in considerable confusion, the rebels (Johnson and Lyon) following them in force up to the road over which we had advanced, and from which they were kept by the Seventy-second Ohio and Mueller’s battery. I endeavored to rally the different regiments and get them to advance to their original position, but failed. I sent word to General Sturgis I was hard pressed, and unless relieved I would be obliged to abandon my position. I was informed that he had nothing to send me. I therefore determined to retire and form another line a short distance in the rear, to keep the enemy from the cross-roads until the artillery could be moved.
As the Federals retired, Lieutenants Haller and Mayson, under orders from Morton, pushed their guns still farther by hand along the narrow roadway to the front, firing as they advanced. Coincident with this, Buford, Lyon, and Rucker closed in from all directions upon the Union forces, now in confusion, crowding them to the cross-roads at Brice’s house, where three pieces of artillery were captured and turned upon the fleeing enemy.
General Sturgis, referring to this period of the engagement, says:
I now endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade which formed the guard of the wagon-train. While traversing the short distance to where the head of that brigade should be found, the main line began to give way at various points. Order soon gave way to confusion, and confusion to panic. . . . The army drifted towards the road and was beyond control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops. Wagons and artillery sank into the deep mud and became inextricable. No power could check the panic-stricken mass as it swept towards the rear.
The panic of the troops was not without effect upon the Union commander. Colonel D. C. Thomas testifies that General Sturgis at this period in the fight proposed to save himself by taking the Nineteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry as an escort, to turn off into some by-way and make his escape.x
About one-quarter of a mile north of the cross-roads, where the Fourth Iowa Cavalry of Winslow’s brigade had dismounted, sent their horses across Tishomingo Creek, and were making a final and desperate stand, Colonel McMillen endeavored to stem the current of disaster by throwing the Fifty-fifth Colored Infantry across the line of retreat. The Fifty-ninth Colored Infantry and Lamberg’s section of artillery were placed somewhat in rear of them, and for the same purpose.
But the on-sweeping tide of the Confederates was running high and could not be withstood. The brave General Buford, with boldness and ability, had pushed Johnson’s Alabamians so far forward on the extreme Confederate right that they struck the flank of Bouton’s Africans from the direction of Tishomingo Creek; and at the same moment, upon the extreme left of the Confederate line, the troopers of Forrest’s escort, under Jackson and Gartrell, with Tyler’s two Kentucky companies mounted, with dare-devil recklessness, swept around the right of the Federal line and rode squarely into the colored infantry with their six-shooters just as Johnson’s troops came in range and opened upon them from the other side.
To add to their discomfiture, Morton and Rice, pushing their guns by hand, were crowding along the main road from Brice’s to the bridge, and now, within gunshot range, rattled away with their charges double shotted with canister.
Nothing could surpass the desperate earnestness of these heroic men who stood to their work throughout this hot and depressing day. Suffering so intensely with thirst, they drank the blackened, powder-stained water from the sponge-buckets, which was being used to cleanse and cool the guns, rather than send one needed man away. Even some of the wounded refused to go to the rear.xi
McMillen’s forlorn hope was demolished so quickly that he scarcely checked the onward rush of Forrest’s men.
Rearward of this position, across the sluggish Tishomingo Creek, there was a narrow wooden bridge which had become hopelessly blocked by the overturning of a wagon and the impaction behind this of several other vehicles. On to this bridge, clambering over the wreckage of wagons and the fallen horses struggling to free themselves mad with fright, the fugitives rushed pell-mell, the soldiers pushing each other off into the stream on either side in their wild efforts to escape. Others, seeing the hopelessness of attempting to cross by the bridge, threw themselves into the creek and waded or swam across while many were drowned or shot as they were floundering in the water.
The Union loss was fearful. Reaching the creek, the Confederates cleared the bridge by pushing the wagons and the dead or wounded animals into the stream.
Meanwhile a detachment of Forrest’s escort under Lieutenant George L. Cowan had effected a crossing about a quarter of a mile below the bridge, and, sweeping around upon the flank of the enemy, charged boldly in among the panic-stricken crowd of fugitives and cut off and captured a large number of prisoners and some wagons. So far was Cowan within the Federal lines that he came in range of Morton’s relentless guns, and it was only when the battle-flag of the escort was waved that he was recognized and the firing in that direction ceased.
The sun was now just above the western horizon, but Forrest had no idea of calling off the chase. The men who had been detailed as horse-holders and were therefore comparatively fresh, were hurried to the front, and under the personal leadership of Forrest and Buford, went forward upon the heels of the beaten army.
Two miles from the battle-field McMillen succeeded in rallying a portion of the first and second brigades under the command of the brave Colonel A. Wilkin, who later fell on the bloody field of Harrisburg. This line, however, could not stand longer than to permit Bouton to pass through with his Africans for Morton came upon the scene with two of his pieces, and after a single round, the Federals vanished. From this point on resistance practically ceased.
Of the result of the fighting, until after twelve o’clock, Colonel Waring says:
It was seen at half-past twelve that our ammunition was reduced to five rounds per man; and when our battery had fired it last shot the infantry began to arrive, and then they came a regiment at a time, or only so fast as the Forrest mill could grind them up in detail. Little by little the enemy pressed upon us, gaining rod after rod of our position, until finally our last arriving troops, a splendid colored regiment, reached the field of battle at double quick, breathless and beaten by their own speed, barely in time to check the assault until we could cross the creek and move towards the rear.
The retreat was but fairly begun when we came upon our train of two hundred wagons piled pell-mell in a small field and blocked in beyond the possibility of removal. The train was our tub to the whale; and while Forrest’s men were sacking our treasures we had time to form for the retreat, more or less orderly according as we had come early or late upon the field.xii
[Union] Major E. H. Hanson reports:
All through the night the beaten army kept on their way, reaching Ripley, twenty-two miles from the battle-field, on the morning of June 11th. During the retreat the enemy captured fourteen pieces of artillery, our entire train of two hundred and fifty wagons loaded with ammunition and ten days’ rations. At Ripley an attempt was made to reorganize our troops into companies and regiments, but the enemy appeared on two sides before this could be accomplished, and we were only able to check them until the retreat could be resumed. It continued in this way to Collierville, Tennessee.
The bitter humiliation of this disaster rankles after a quarter of a century. The enemy may have numbered three thousand five hundred or four thousand, but it must be reluctantly confessed that not more than this number is believed to have been in action. If there was during the war, another engagement like this, it is unknown to the writer; and in its immediate result there was no success, among the many won by Forrest, comparable to that of Guntown.xiii
An amusing incident of the flight of Sturgis’s command is given by Colonel George E. Waring, Jr., who says: “Grierson ordered me to prevent the pushing ahead of the stragglers of the other brigades, who were to be recognized, he remined me, by their wearing hats (mine wore caps). The order was peremptory and was to be enforced at the cost of cutting the offenders down. We were all sleeping more or less of the time, but constantly some hatted straggler was detected pushing towards the front, and ordered back. Close to my right, and pushing slowly to the front, came a gray horse with a hatted rider, an India-rubber poncho covering his uniform. I ordered him back, and the adjutant, eager for the enforcement of the order, remonstrated at the man’s disobedience. I ordered him again, but without result. The adjutant ejaculated, ‘Damn him, cut him down!’ I drew my sabre, and laid it flat, on one long stinging welt, across that black poncho. ——- Who are you hitting? Then we both remembered that Grierson, too, wore a hat, and I tender him here my public acknowledgment of his good-nature and generous silence.”xiv
Forrest’s men, who had done the fighting on foot, were allowed to rest until one o’clock, while the horse-holders kept hammering away at the fleeing enemy, to give them no respite.
At 3 a.m. Buford in force came upon their rear in the Hatchie bottoms, and here the balance of the wagon-train and fourteen pieces of artillery additional fell into the hands of the gallant Kentuckian. Four miles from Ripley, Grierson had rallied a forlorn hope, but, with the escort and the Seventh Tennessee alone, Forrest, leading the charge in person, attacked them and after a feeble resistance scattered them “like chaff before the winds.”
All through the day and until nightfall on the 11th the pursuit was continued, and only closed when, near Salem, in sight of the home of his youth, Forrest, completely exhausted, was seized with a fainting-spell, fell from his horse, and remained unconscious for nearly an hour, to the great alarm of his devoted followers.
The battle at Brice’s Cross-Roads demonstrated the truth of the adage that “the battle is not to the strong.” The Federals were not defeated for lack of courage, as the fighting qualities of these men, when properly handled, was in a succeeding engagement fully proven.
From ten until four, beneath the fierce heat of a Southern sun, the men of Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Tennessee had struggled in desperate and often hand-to-hand conflict with the sturdy soldiers of Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, and New Jersey; while there can be no doubt that great credit was due to the splendid fighting qualities of the men under Forrest and to his officers, as determined and courageous as himself, nothing on that day, and against such odds, could have saved his army from defeat and destruction but the marvelous genius of the “unlettered soldier.”
He had fought on the field a body of veteran troops which greatly outnumbered him, and, withal, advantageously posted, as he had been the assailant from the beginning. To reach the battlefield the Federals had only nine miles to march; the greater portion of Forrest’s command had covered twenty-five miles, and his artillery had made eighteen miles before they came into action.
The vigorous and tireless pursuit was as wonderful as the victory on the field. It seems almost incredible that men could have endured what this little army of Forrest’s endured on those two days of June.
The artillery of Morton and Rice had started from Booneville at 5 a.m. on the 10th, had marched eighteen miles, and then for five hours had been engaged without intermission in desperate conflict; had followed the enemy from the field until well into the night, and, after seven hours of rest, pushed onward, keeping up with, and at times even in front of, the advance-guard of Forrest’s cavalry; had reached Salem on the night of the 11th, making sixty-one miles in thirty-eight hours, besides fighting for five hours of that time, a record possibly without a parallel in artillery fighting. So energetic had been Morton’s pursuit that fifteen horses fell dead in harness from exhaustion.
Bell’s brigade, at 4 a.m. on the 10th, had left Rienzi, marched twenty-five miles to the battlefield, fought from 2 p.m. until 5 p.m., pursued the enemy from the field until 7, and at 8 p.m. on the night of the 11th, camped at Davis’s Mill, twelve miles north of Salem, having made eighty miles in forty hours.
No wonder the army of Sturgis had melted away in a wild stampede, until it was every one for himself. Few escaped, excepting those who had horses, or who cut them loose from the wagons and the artillery. The infantry suffered most heavily in killed and captured, while the colored troops, believing that no quarter would be shown them, scattered in all directions, taking to the woods and bottoms for safety.
On the morning of the 11th, at Ripley, General Sturgis writes: “Nothing was left but to keep in motion.” On the 12th he was at Collierville, after a run of forty-eight hours with scarcely a halt, and on the 13th, at 9 a.m., a fragment of his fleeing command was at White’s station. It had taken his army nine days to march from this point to Brice’s Cross-Roads. The return trip was made in sixty-four hours.
General Washburn says: “The expedition left the railroad terminus on June 1st, and reached Brice’s Cross-Roads on June 10th. The force that escaped returned to this point in one day and two nights.”
The Confederates lost heavily in killed and wounded. The report of the chief surgeon, Dr. J. B. Cowan, gives 493 killed and wounded. In Rucker’s brigade the loss was twenty-three percent, and in Lyon’s command over twenty percent were killed and wounded.
General Sturgis, in his official report, made on the 24th of June, gave his loss of killed, wounded, and missing, as 2,240. The detailed reports of his brigade and regimental commanders show his loss to have been 2,612.
General Forrest captured 250 wagons and ambulances, 18 pieces of artillery, 5,000 stands of small arms, 500,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition, and all the enemy’s baggage and supplies.
That the Federals threw away everything which would impede their flight is evident from the reports of the subordinate officers. Colonel George B. Hoge gives the original strength of his brigade at 1,674, of which 748 were killed, wounded, and missing.xv Of the remaining 926 who escaped, only 267 had not thrown away their guns!
Wilkins’s regimental commanders report 1,003 lost in the second brigade. The Ninth Minnesota lost 287 out of 665. Bouton’s colored regiments lost 528 out of a total of 1,200. Wring’s cavalry brigade lost 207, and Winslow’s 126. Total Federal loss, 2,612.
In his official report General Sturgis says: “I need hardly add that it was with feelings of the most profound pain and regret that I found myself called upon to record a defeat and the loss and suffering incident to a reverse. Yet there is some consolation in knowing that the army fought nobly while it did fight, and only yielded to overwhelming numbers. The strength of the enemy is estimated by the most intelligent officers as fifteen to twenty thousand men.”xvi He adds: “A very intelligent sergeant who was captured says the enemy had actually engaged, 12,000 men, and had two divisions of infantry in reserve.”
The overthrow of Sturgis caused scarcely less anxiety at the headquarters of Generals Grant and Sherman, and at Washington, than was felt by General Washburn at Memphis. Grant says, in his Memoirs: “Farther west, also, the troubles were threatening. Some time before, Forrest had met Sturgis, in command of some cavalry in Mississippi, and handled him very roughly, gaining a great victory over him. This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of Sherman, who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he had immediately with him, and all of his military division, so long as he could communicate with it, but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two divisions, under A. J. Smith, had been sent to Louisiana some months before. Sherman ordered these back with directions to attack Forrest.”xvii
General Sherman, who on the 23d of May addressed the governors of Missouri, Indiana, Iowa, and Wisconsin, calling for militia to be sent to Memphis to co-operate with him in preventing Forrest and Lee from swinging over against his communicationsxviii was now more than ever upset. The anxiety which he felt is shown in a dispatch to General Thomas dated June 9th, which says: “I cannot hear of Forrest, though I believe the expedition which left Memphis June 1st, composed of three thousand cavalry and five thousand infantry, will give him good employment.” Again, on the 13th to Halleck, he insists that “there are troops enough in Tennessee to watch Forrest, should he make his appearance there, as Johnston doubtless calculates.”
Stanton, Secretary of War, on June 14th telegraphed General Sherman that he had just received the report of the battle between Sturgis and Forrest, “in which our forces were defeated with great loss. Washburn estimates our loss at not less than three thousand. Forrest is in pursuit.”xix
Sherman replied that he had just received the same news of the defeat of Sturgis, “whose chief object was to hold Forrest there to keep him off our road. Of course it is to be deplored, but we must prepare for all contingencies. I have ordered A. J. Smith not to go to Mobile, but to go to Memphis and defeat Forrest at all cost. Forrest has only his cavalry; I cannot understand how he could defeat Sturgis with eight thousand men.”
On the 15th he adds to Stanton:
I will have the matter of Sturgis critically examined, and if he should be at fault he shall have no mercy at my hands. I cannot but believe he had troops enough. I know I would have been willing to attempt the same task with that force; but Forrest is the devil, and I think he has got some of our troops under cower. I have two officers at Memphis who will fight all the time
: A. J. Smith and Mower. The latter is a young brigadier of fine promise, and I commend him to your notice. I will order them to make up a force and go out to follow Forrest to the death, if it costs ten thousand lives and breaks the Treasury. There will never be peace in Tennessee until Forrest is dead!
And with an evident air of satisfaction this bloody-minded warrior closes this dispatch by saying: “We killed Bishop Polk yesterday and have made good progress to-day.”xx
The disturbance of the various plans of campaign which were then in operation as the result of this victory of Forrest’s is further shown from General McPherson’s dispatch to General Dodge on the 15th of June saying that, on account of the defeat of Sturgis by Forrest, Colonel Howe would remain at Decatur with his brigade until further orders.
Sherman, on the 16th of June, dispatched Stanton that he would send as large a force as he could get on Forrest’s trail and harass him and the counties through which he passed. “We must destroy him if possible.” On the 20th of this month he telegraphed to Rousseau, at Nashville, that he had determined to wait to see what Forrest would do, adding: “I propose to keep him occupied from Memphis. He whipped Sturgis fair and square, and now I have got against him A. J. Smith and Mower, and will let them try their hands.”
At the close of this campaign, on the 28th of June, General Forrest issued an address to his soldiers, recapitulating their achievements in the defeat of William Sooy Smith, the successful expedition into west Tennessee, with the capture of Union City and Fort Pillow, and the overthrow of Sturgis’s command at Tishomingo Creek.
While these were triumphs of which any general might well feel a great and just pride, between the lines of this eloquent address one can recognize the cleverness of the diplomatist. Lauding to the skies their past performances, this skillful leader of men no doubt intended to stimulate his soldiers to further effort under his command.
It has a touch of the old-fashioned Fourth of July oratory which was in vogue in the Southern States in the period preceding the Civil War. General Forrest was remarkable for his ready command of language. This address, as well as all of his reports and addresses, was dictated by him to Major Charles W. Anderson, or some other member of his staff.
Major Anderson states that often after the first draft of a report or address was made it would be read over to the general, who, although a man of limited education, would not only quickly detect a grammatical error, but would criticize and correct a phrase improperly constructed. His usual remark was, “That hasn’t got the right pitch.”
“Headquarters Forrest’s Cavalry,“SOLDIERS,
“After a short repose you were called to a new theatre of action. By long and rapid marches, which you endured without murmur or complaint, you found yourselves upon the waters of the Ohio, sweeping the enemy before you wherever you met him, capturing hundreds of prisoners, valuable and needed stores in the quartermaster’s and ordnance departments, while securing for yourselves a character for endurance, valor, and efficiency which might well excite the envy of the most famous legions in military history. At Fort Pillow you exhibited the same conspicuous gallantry. In the face of a murderous fire from two gunboats and six pieces of artillery on the fort, you stormed the works and either killed or captured the entire garrison, a motley herd of negroes, traitors, and Yankees. This noble work was accomplished by parts of Chalmer’s and Buford’s divisions, composed of Bell’s and McCulloch’s brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General Chalmers; and for his gallantry on this and other occasions General Chalmers deserves the enduring gratitude of his countrymen. For the exhibitions of high soldiery bearing on these fields you have earned from your country and its government the most grateful and well-deserved plaudits. Congress has voted you complimentary resolutions of thanks and tendered you a nation’s homage.
“But the crowning glory of your great deeds has yet to be named. Tishomingo Creek is the brightest leaf in your chaplet of laurel. General Grierson, not satisfied with his test of your prowess, united with General Sturgis at the head of one of the best-appointed forces ever equipped by the Yankee nation
“Soldiers! amid your rejoicing do not forget the gallant dead upon these field of glory. Many a noble comrade has fallen, a costly sacrifice to his country’s independence. The most you can do is to cherish their memory and strive to make the future as glorious as you and they have made the past.
“To Brigadier-General Buford, commanding division, my obligations are especially due. His gallantry and activity on the field were ever conspicuous, and for the energy displayed in pursuing the enemy he deserves much of his government. He has abundant cause to be proud of his brigade commanders, Colonels Lyon and Bell, who displayed great gallantry during the day. Colonel E. W. Rucker was prompt in the discharge of every duty. His brigade displayed conspicuous steadiness during the fight. Colonel W. A. Johnson, commanding brigade from General Roddey’s command, merits notice for his coolness and bravery on this occasion, and for the valuable services rendered by his troops. Nor can the general commanding forget to mention the efficient aid rendered by the artillery, commanded by Captain John W. Morton. He moved rapidly over the roughest ground and was always in action at the right time, and his well-directed fire dealt destruction in the masses of the enemy. The general commanding also takes pleasure in noticing the intelligent alacrity with which Major C. W. Anderson, Captain W. H. Brand, Lieutenants Otey, Donelson, Titus, and Galloway, of my staff, conveyed order to all parts of the field. They were ever near my person, and were prompt in the discharge of every duty. Soldiers! you have done much, but there is still work for you to do. By prompt obedience to orders and patient endurance you will be enabled to repeat these great achievements. The enemy is again preparing to break through the living wall erected by your noble bosoms and big hearts. In the name and recollections of ruined homes, desolated fields, and the bleaching bones of your martyred comrades, you are appealed to again. The smoke of your burning homesteads, the screams of your insulted women, the cries of starving children will again nerve your strong arms with strength. Your fathers of ’76 had much to fight for, but how little and unimportant was their cause compared with yours. They fought not against annihilation, but simply to be independent of a foreign yet a constitutional and free government. You are struggling against the most odious of all tyranny, for existence itself, for your property, your homes, your wives and children, against your own enslavement, against emancipation, confiscation, and subjugation, with all their attendant horrors.
“In conclusion, your commanding general congratulates you on the brilliant prospects which everywhere pervade our cause. The independence of the Confederate States is a fixed, accomplished, immutable fact. The ray of peace is glimmering like bright sunshine around the dark clouds. Be true to yourselves and your country a little while longer and you will soon be enabled to return to your desolate homes, there to collect together once more your scattered household gods.
“By order of Major-General N. B. Forrest.i John Allan Wyeth, M.D., Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1899), 402-429; reprint, That Devil Forrest, Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989).
ii Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iv. p. 420.
iii Ibid.
iv Official Records, vol. xxxix. part i. p. 132.
v Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iv. p. 420.
vi Diary of Colonel C. R. Barteau, in possession of the author.
vii Official Records, vol. xxxix. part i. p. 119.
viii Official Records, vol. xxxix. part i. p. 92.
ix Manuscripts in possession of the author.
x Official Records, vol. xxxix. part i. p. 171.
xi James Moran, a mere lad, who was badly wounded, when told by Captain Morton to go to the hospital, replied: “Captain, I don’t want to go; I can stand it until we run ’em away.”
xii Whip and Spur.
xiii Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iv.
xiv Whip and Spur.
xv Official Records, vol. xxxix. part i. p. 120.
xvi Ibid. p. 95.
xvii Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. ii. p. 306.
xviii Official Records, vol. xxxviii. part iv.
xix Ibid. p. 474.
xx Ibid. p. 480.
xxi Official Records, Series I. vol. xxxix. p. 228.
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